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Abstract—The robustness of deep neural networks has received
significant interest recently, especially when being deployed in
safety-critical systems, as it is important to analyze how sensitive
the model output is under input perturbations. While most
previous works focused on the local robustness property around an
input sample, the studies of the global robustness property, which
bounds the maximum output change under perturbations over the
entire input space, are still lacking. In this work, we formulate
the global robustness certification for neural networks with
ReLU activation functions as a mixed-integer linear programming
(MILP) problem, and present an efficient approach to address it.
Our approach includes a novel interleaving twin-network encoding
scheme, where two copies of the neural network are encoded
side-by-side with extra interleaving dependencies added between
them, and an over-approximation algorithm leveraging relaxation
and refinement techniques to reduce complexity. Experiments
demonstrate the timing efficiency of our work when compared
with previous global robustness certification methods and the
tightness of our over-approximation. A case study of closed-loop
control safety verification is conducted, and demonstrates the
importance and practicality of our approach for certifying the
global robustness of neural networks in safety-critical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are being applied to a wide
range of tasks, such as perception, prediction, planning, control,
and general decision making. While DNNs often show signif-
icant advantages in performance over traditional model-based
methods, pressing concerns have been raised on the uncertain
behaviors of DNNs under varying inputs, especially for safety-
critical systems such as autonomous vehicles and robots. Some
of the well-trained DNNs are found to be vulnerable to a small
adversarial perturbation on their inputs [1]. The robustness
metric of DNNs is defined to bound such uncertain behaviors
when the input is perturbed. Specifically, the robustness of a
DNN represents how much its output varies when its input has
a bounded perturbation, where the perturbation can be either
from random noises or due to malicious attacks.
Formal methods, such as Satisfiability Modulo Theo-
ries (SMT) [2], [3] and Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) [4], have been used to either find an adversarial ex-
ample or certify the robustness (i.e., proving no adversarial ex-
ample exists) around a given input sample, which is considered
as local robustness. The efficiency is improved by certifying a
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conservative (sound but not complete) local robustness bound
via over-approximated output range analysis methods [5], [6].
In safety-critical systems with DNNs involved, it is important
to analyze the DNN robustness for evaluating system safety. As
local robustness is defined locally to a given input sample, to
evaluate system safety, we will need to apply local robustness
certification during runtime for each input sample that the
system encounters or may encounter. However, the complexity
of local robustness certification, even with conservative over-
approximation, is too high for runtime execution in most
practical systems. Moreover, sometimes it is required to ensure
system safety for future time horizon (e.g., to verify there is
no collision for the next 3 seconds). As future input samples
are unknown, local robustness certification cannot be applied.
Instead, we could address system safety by considering
the problem of global robustness, which measures the worst-
case DNN output change against input perturbation for all
possible input samples. The definition of the global robustness
is introduced in [2], with a proposed SMT-based tool Reluplex
for certifying the exact global robustness. In [7], the global
robustness for classification problems is formulated into MILP
to find the maximum input perturbation that can preserve
the classification result. In [8], an MILP-based exact global
robustness certification method is proposed for logic ensemble
classifier (a generalized-version of decision tree, not DNN).
A major challenge for exact global robustness certification
is its complexity – while it can be run offline to facilitate
safety analysis (since it considers the entire input space), the
high complexity often makes it intractable even in offline
computation. While a number of methods have been proposed
to tackle the complexity, they often lack the deterministic
guarantees needed for safety verification. For instance, dataset-
based global robustness estimation approaches are proposed
in several works [9], [10], which conduct local robustness
certification for each sample in the dataset and find the worst
case or the average. As the dataset only contains finite number
of samples and cannot covers all possible input samples,
the derived global robustness is just an estimation with no
deterministic guarantees. Sampling-based methods [11], [12]
randomly sample the DNN inputs, evaluate the local robustness
of the random-sampled inputs, and provide a probabilistic
global robustness. Similarly, they cannot provide deterministic



















Fig. 1. An example neural network for illustration.
the input space into regions, where all possible inputs in
each certified-robust region have the same classification result.
However, the number of regions could be extremely large for
DNNs with high-dimensional inputs, making it hard to certify
all regions and provide deterministic guarantees.
In this work, we propose an efficient certification approach
to over-approximate the global robustness. The derived global
robustness is sound and deterministic, the over-approximation
is tight, and the approach can be used effectively for the purpose
of safety verification. To achieve this, our approach introduces
a novel network encoding structure, namely interleaving twin-
network encoding, to compare two copies of the neural network
side-by-side under different inputs, with extra interleaving
dependencies added between them to improve efficiency. Our
approach also includes over-approximation techniques based
on network decomposition and LP (linear programming) relax-
ation, to further reduce the computation complexity. To the best
of our knowledge, our approach is the first global robustness
over-approximation method that certifies the robustness among
the entire input domain with sound and deterministic guarantee.
Experiments show that our approach is much more efficient
and scalable than the exact global robustness methods such as
Reluplex [2], with tight over-approximation – our approach can
certify DNNs with more than 5k neurons in 5 hours while the
exact methods cannot certify DNNs with more than 64 neurons
in 1 day. To demonstrate the importance of global robustness
and the practical application of our certification approach, a
case study is conducted to verify the safety of a closed-loop
control system with a vision-based perception DNN in the loop.
II. EFFICIENT GLOBAL ROBUSTNESS CERTIFICATION
A. Problem Formulation
An n-layer neural network, formulated as F : Rm0 → Rmn
maps an m0-dimension input x(0) ∈ Rm0 into an mn-
dimension output x(n) ∈ Rmn . In the neural network, the
output of each layer i is denoted as x(i) ∈ Rmi with dimension
mi, and layer i maps the output from the previous layer x(i−1)
into its output by x(i) = f (i)(x(i−1)). f (i) is composed with
a linear transformation y(i) = W (i)x(i−1) + b(i) (e.g., fully-
connected layer, convolution layer, average pooling or nor-
malization), and (optionally) a ReLU activation function. The
linear transformation result is denoted as intermittent variable
y(i) ∈ Rmi . The layer output x(i) = relu(y(i)) = max(y(i), 0)
if it has ReLU activation function, and x(i) = y(i) otherwise.
An illustrating example is shown in Fig. 1, which is a 2-
layer neural network that maps 2-dimension input x(0) into
1-dimension output x(2) with a 2-neuron hidden layer. For
simplicity, the bias b(i) of each layer i is set to 0.
We consider the global robustness over the entire input
domain X of the neural network, i.e., ∀x(0) ∈ X . It measures
the worst-case output variation when there is a small input
perturbation for any possible input sample in the input domain
X . Moreover, we focus on the input perturbation that is
bounded in the form of L∞ norm, and have the same global
robustness definition as [2], [14].
Definition 1 (Global Robustness). The j-th output of neural
network F is (δ, ε)-globally robust in the input domain X iff
∀x(0), x̂(0) ∈ X, ∥x̂(0) − x(0)∥∞ ≤ δ =⇒ |x̂(n)j − x
(n)
j | ≤ ε
where x(n) = F (x(0)) and x̂(n) = F (x̂(0)).
In this work, we tackle the problem of how robust the neural
network is, i.e., how small ε can be for a given δ. This problem
can be formally defined as:
Problem 1. For a neural network F , given an input perturba-
tion bound δ, determine the minimal output variation bound ε
such that F is guaranteed to be (δ, ε)-globally robust.
The authors in [2] propose an idea to solve the global
robustness problem by encoding two copies of neural network
side by side, which is illustrated in the left part of Fig. 2. The
two network copies take two separate inputs x(0) and x̂(0) and
produce outputs x(n) and x̂(n). As a perturbation of x(0), x̂(0) is
restricted by the input perturbation ∆x(0) = x̂(0)−x(0), where
∥∆x(0)∥∞ ≤ δ. The output variation bound ε is the bound of
the output distance ∆x(n) = x̂(n)−x(n). Under this encoding,
the global robustness in Problem 1 can be formulated as the
following optimization problem.
ε := max |x̂(n) − x(n)|
s.t. x̂(n) = F (x̂(0)), x(n) = F (x(0))
x̂(0), x(0) ∈ X, ∥x̂(0) − x(0)∥∞ < δ
(1)
Equation (1) can be solved by mixed-integer linear program-
ming (MILP), where the neural network F can be decomposed
into a series of neuron-wise dependency. For the j-th neuron























j , 0) (3)
The max(x, 0) function for each ReLU activation can be
linearized by Big-M method [7] with the introduction of a new
integer (binary) variable to indication whether y < 0.
The complexity to solve this MILP is exponential to the
number of ReLU neurons, making it too complex for most
practical neural networks. In this work, to overcome this chal-
lenge, we present 1) a new interleaving twin-network encod-
ing (ITNE) scheme that adds extra interleaving dependencies
between the two copies of the neural network, and 2) two
approximation techniques leveraging the new encoding scheme,
namely network decomposition (ND) and LP relaxation (LPR),
to efficiently find an over-approximated sub-optimal solution ε̄
of the output variation bound ε, where ε̄ ≥ ε.
















Fig. 2. Left: The basic twin-network encoding (BTNE) for global robust-
ness certification. Right: the neuron-level interleaving twin-network encoding
(ITNE) built upon the basic structure, where the hidden layer neurons are
connected between the two copies with distance variables ∆y(i)j and ∆x
(i)
j .
B. Interleaving Twin-Network Encoding
We call the neural network encoding scheme introduced
in [2], shown in the left side of Fig. 2 with only input and output
layers connected, the basic twin-network encoding (BTNE). In
contrast, the new network encoding scheme we designed to
enable the over-approximation techniques for global robustness
certification is shown in the right side of Fig. 2 and called the
interleaving twin-network encoding (ITNE).
In ITNE, besides the connections between the input and
output layers, interleaving connections are added for all hidden
layer neurons between the two network copies. Specifically, for
the j-th neuron of layer i, two variables, ∆y(i)j and ∆x
(i)
j , are
added to encode the distance of y(i)j and x
(i)






















Note that these distance variables do not impact the forward
propagation of the two network copies, but they contain the
information of how different the two copies are during the
forward propagation. Such information enables the usage of
the over-approximation techniques introduced below.
C. Over-Approximation Techniques
Leveraging ITNE, we design two over-approximation tech-
niques, network decomposition (ND) and LP relaxation (LPR),
to improve the global robustness certification efficiency. The
two techniques are inspired by the local robustness certification
work in [6]. However, there are major differences between
global and local robustness certification, given that the former
considers the entire input space X while the latter only consid-
ers a given input x(0) ∈ X , and our ND and LPR techniques
are specifically designed for global robustness.
a) ITNE-based network decomposition (ND): The main
idea of ND is to divide a neural network into sub-networks
and decompose the entire optimization problem into smaller
problems. The input of a sub-network is either the network
input or the output of other sub-networks. Given the range
of the input of a sub-network, the range of its output can
be derived by solving an optimization problem of the sub-
network, which can then be used as the input range of the
next sub-network. As the complexity of MILP is exponential to
the neural network size, using ND can significantly reduce the
complexity of the optimization problem. For global robustness
certification, we also consider two copies of each sub-network.
However, instead of finding the output range of each sub-
network copy, we look for the range of one sub-network copy
and the range of the output distance, based on the ITNE.
More specifically, a w-layer sub-network with input x(i−w)
and output x(i)j (i ≥ w) is denoted as Fw(x
(i)
j ). For any variable
v, its range is denoted as v = [v, v]. Under ITNE, for each
sub-network Fw(x
(i)
j ), given the input range x
(i−w) and input
distance range ∆x(i−w), we can derive the output range x(i)j
and output distance range ∆x(i)j by solving the optimization
problem in Equation 1 for this sub-network.
b) ITNE-based LP relaxation (LPR): The idea of LPR is
to relax the ReLU relation x = max(0, y) into linear constraints
given the range of y as [y, y]. When y ≤ 0 or y ≥ 0, the
ReLU relation degenerates to linear relation x = 0 or x =
y. Otherwise, ReLU relation can be relaxed by three linear
inequations:




The ReLU relations of a neuron in the two network copies
are formulated in Equations (2) and (3). In our work, instead of
relaxing the ReLU relations in two network copies separately,
we relax Equation (2) by the original LPR in Equation (4), and
relax the ReLU distance relation based on ITNE:
∆x = relu(y +∆y)− relu(y). (5)
For a given y, the relation between ∆x and ∆y can be found
in the first two plots of Fig. 3. Therefore, the shadowed area
in the third plot of Fig. 3 can cover all possible (∆x,∆y)
mappings for ∀y ∈ R. Given ∆y ∈ [∆y,∆y], the relation
between ∆x and ∆y can be bounded by the linear lower and




≤ ∆x ≤ u(∆y − l)
u− l
, (6)
where l = min(0,∆y) and u = max(0,∆y).
D. Illustrating example
Consider the example neural network in Fig. 1. Assume
that the input perturbation bound as δ = 0.1 and the input
domain as x(0) ∈ [−1, 1]2. The example neural network can be
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Fig. 3. Left: ReLU distance relation when y ≥ 0; Middle: ReLU distance
relation when y < 0; Right: LP-relaxation of ReLU distance relation. The
ReLU distance relation for ∀y ∈ R lays in the shadowed area. Within the















For local robustness, consider input x(0) = [0, 0], the
certification processes for different techniques are shown in
Fig. 4. The exact bound of x̂(2) is derived by solving the
MILP problem for the entire network. ND solves the MILP
problems of the first two sub-networks to derive the bound
of x̂(1) and then derive the bound of x̂(2) by solving the






(2) ∈ [−0.15, 0.15], all ReLU relations can be
relaxed based on Equation (4), and the bound of x̂(2) can
be derived by solving the relaxed LP problem. As we can
see ND and LPR can provide tight (1.2x and 1.15x) over-
approximations for local robustness.
For global robustness, under BTNE, there are no distance
variables for hidden neurons, which means that ND and LPR
can only be applied to each individual network copy. ND
will only find the range of x(1) and x̂(1) and when comes
to the third sub-network, the distance information between
two network copies is lost, which results in a 7.5x over-
approximation of the range of ∆x(2). The LPR is based on the
bounds y(1), ŷ(1) ∈ [−1.5, 1.5]2, and y(2), ŷ(2) ∈ [−1.5, 1.5],
which results in a 10.9x over-approximation. On the other hand,
under ITNE, the ITNE-based ND can first find the range of
x(1) and ∆x(1) and then derive the range of ∆x(2), which
is only 1.5x of the exact one. Given ∆y(1) ∈ [−0.15, 0.15]2
and ∆y(2) ∈ [−0.3, 0.3], the ITNE-based LPR can derive a
1.38x over-approximation of the range of ∆x(2). This shows
that combing ITNE with ND and LPR can significantly improve
the approximation tightness over BTNE.
E. Efficient Global Robustness Over-Approximation Algorithm
Finally, we design our global robustness certification algo-
rithm by leveraging the ITNE encoding as well as the ND and
LPR techniques, as shown in Algorithm 1. Note that the MILP
problems for sub-networks from ND are relaxed by LPR. The
pre-assigned window size W is defined as the desired depth
of sub-networks. For LPR, besides the range of the input and
distance, y(i−k) and ∆y(i−k) for ∀k ∈ [0, w − 1] are also




, we can consider a w-layer
sub-network with y(i)j as the output (i.e., no ReLU activation
at the output layer), denoted as Fw(y
(i)
j ). Formally, we have
Global Robustness 𝑖 = 0 𝑖 = 1 𝑖 = 2
Exact
Δො𝑥(𝑖) −0.1, 0.1 2 −0.2, 0.2









Δො𝑥(𝑖) −0.1, 0.1 2 −1.5, 1.5
𝑥(𝑖), ො𝑥(𝑖) −1, 1 2 0, 1.5 2 0, 1.5
LPR
Δො𝑥(𝑖) −0.1, 0.1 2 −2.85, 1.5






Δො𝑥(𝑖) −0.1, 0.1 2 −0.15, 0.15 2 −0.3, 0.3
𝑥(𝑖), ො𝑥(𝑖) −1, 1 2 0, 1.5 2 0, 1.5
LPR
Δො𝑥(𝑖) −0.1, 0.1 2 −0.275, 0.275





Local Robustness ො𝑥(0) ො𝑥(1) ො𝑥(2)
Exact −0.1, 0.1 2 0, 0.125
ND −0.1, 0.1 2 0, 0.15 2 0, 0.15




Fig. 4. Illustrating example: The local and global robustness certification
processes of exact MILP, network decomposition (ND) and LP relaxation
(LPR). For global robustness, the ND and LPR for both basic and interleaving
twin-network encoding (i.e., BTNE and ITNE) are illustrated.
Algorithm 1 Global Robustness Certification Algorithm
Input: Neural Network F , window size W , refine param r
Input: input domain X , input perturbation bound δ
Output: output variation bound ε̄
1: x(0) = X
2: ∆x(i) = [−δ, δ]m0
3: for i = 1 : n do
4: w = max(i,W )
5: for j = 1 : mi do
6: Fw(y
(i)
j )← NetDecompose(F, y
(i)
j , w)







)← LpRelaxY (ey, r)
9: Fw(x
(i)
j )← NetDecompose(F, x
(i)
j , w)





j )← LpRelaxX(ex, r)
12: end for
13: end for
14: ε̄← max(|∆x(n)|, |∆x(n)|)
two types of sub-network optimization problems: LpRelaxY
and LpRelaxX , which is respectively encoded (line 7 and 9)
as ITNE of sub-network Fw(y
(i)
j ) and Fw(x
(i)
j ) (decomposed
from network F in line 6 and 9). Both problems require the
sub-network input range x(i−w), ∆x(i−w) and the ranges for
hidden neurons, i.e., y(i−k) and ∆y(i−k),∀k ∈ [1, w − 1] as





which is derived from LpRelaxY (line 8). Therefore, the
ranges need to be evaluated layer by layer, by treating these





j ). In such a way, when evaluating the ranges of certain
layer, all ranges of previous layers have been derived.
Selective Refinement: While LPR can remove all integer
TABLE I
NEURAL NETWORK SETTING AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS.
Dataset ID Neurons tR tM tour ε ε (ours)
Auto
MPG
1 8 2s 0.1s 0.3s 0.0583 0.0657
2 12 130s 0.2s 0.4s 0.0527 0.0722
3 16 8h 0.8s 1s 0.0496 0.0653
4 32 > 24h 74s 5s 0.0481 0.0673
Dataset ID Neurons Layers tour ε ε (ours)
Auto
MPG 5 64 FC:3 50s 0.0452 0.0731
MNIST
6 1416 Conv:1FC:2 4.8h
0.347 0.578
0.300 0.572
7 3872 Conv:2FC:2 3.3h
0.453 0.874
0.420 0.723
8 5824 Conv:3FC:2 3.5h
0.519 1.521
0.407 1.175
In Table I, ‘Layers’ are the type and number of layers; ‘Neurons’ is the total
number of hidden neurons; tR, tM , tour are the certification time of exact
MILP, Reluplex, and our approach, respectively; ε, ε, ε are the exact (derived
by Reluplex or MILP), under-approximated (derived by projected gradient
descent (PGD) among dataset), and over-approximated (derived by our
approach) output variation bounds, respectively.
variables in the MILP formulation to reduce the complexity,
such extreme over-approximation may be too inaccurate. Thus,
we try to selectively refine a limited number of neurons, by not
relaxing their ReLU relations. This is similar to the layer-level
refinement idea in [6], but with a focus on global robustness.
Specifically, a score of LPR is evaluated for each neuron as the
worst-case inaccuracy, and the top r neurons will be refined.
The score is defined as the maximum distance between the
lower and upper bound of LPR, i.e., the score is −yy/(y − y)
for Equation (4), and max(|∆y|, |∆y|) for Equation (6). The
number of neurons for refinement r is a parameter that can be
set in LPR, as shown in Algorithm 1 (lines 8 and 11).
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first evaluate our algorithm on DNNs
with different sizes and compare our derived over-approximated
global robustness with either exact global robustness (when
available) or an under-approximated global robustness. Then,
we demonstrate the application of our approach in a case study
of safety verification for a vision-based robotic control system,
and show the importance of efficient global robustness certifi-
cation for safety-critical systems that involve neural networks.
We implement our efficient global robustness certification
algorithm in Python. All MILP/LP problems in the algorithm
are solved by Gurobi [15]. All the experiments are conducted
on a platform with a 4-core 3.6 GHz Intel Xeon CPU and 16
GB memory. All neural networks are modeled in Tensorflow.
A. Comparison with Other Methods
We conduct experiments on a set of DNNs with different
sizes and evaluate their global robustness with our efficient
certification algorithm and other methods. The DNNs are
trained for two datasets: the Auto MPG dataset [16] for ve-
hicle fuel consumption prediction, and the MNIST handwritten
digits classification dataset [17]. Specifically, besides the fully-
connected (FC) output layer, the Auto MPG DNNs contain 2
FC hidden layers with the number of hidden neurons ranging
from 8 to 64. MNIST DNNs contain 1 to 3 convolutional layers
followed by 1 FC hidden layer, with 1472 to 7176 hidden
neurons. We certify the output variation bound ε based on the
input perturbation bound δ, where δ = 0.001 for Auto MPG
DNNs and δ = 2/255 for MNIST DNNs.
The network settings and the comparison among different
approaches are shown in Table I. For our approach, window
size W = 2 for Auto MPG DNNs, and W = 3 for MNIST
DNNs. Half neurons are refined in Auto MPG DNNs and 30
neurons in each layer are refined in MNIST DNNs. Although
MNIST have 10 outputs, we only present the results of 2 of
them in Table I because of the limited space (the other outputs
show similar differences between different methods).
For small networks (DNN-1 to DNN-5), we compare our
over-approximated output variation bound ε with the exact
bound ε solved by Reluplex1 [2] and the MILP encoding
in Equation (1). We can see that the timing consumption
of Reluplex tR and MILP tM quickly exploded with the
increase of neural network size. None of them can get a
solution within 24 hours for DNN-5 (with only 64 hidden
neurons). From DNN-1 to DNN-4, our algorithm can derive an
over-approximated global robustness with much slower timing
consumption increase, while only have about 13% to 40% over-
approximation over the exact global robustness.
Starting from DNN-5, the two exact certification methods
cannot find a solution in reasonable time. There is also no
other work in the literature that can derive a sound and
deterministic global robustness. To assess how good our over-
approximated results are for larger networks, we evaluate an
under-approximation of the global robustness, inspired by [9].
Specifically, for each data sample in the dataset, we leverage
projected gradient descent (PGD) [19] to look for an adversarial
example in the input perturbation bound that maximizes the
output variation, and treat the maximal output variation among
the entire dataset as an under-approximated output variation
bound ε. The exact global robustness should be between the
under-approximation ε derived from this dataset-wise PGD, and
the over-approximation ε derived by our certification algorithm.
The experiments from DNN-6 to DDN-8 demonstrate that our
method can provide meaningful over-approximation (less
than 3x of the under-approximation) for DNNs with more
than 5000 hidden neurons within 5 hours.
B. Case Study on Control Safety Verification
For control systems that use neural networks for perception,
a critical and yet challenging question is whether the system
can remain safe when there is perturbation/disturbance to the
perception neural network input. In [14], the authors formulate
this as a design-time safety assurance problem based on global
robustness, i.e., if a global robustness bound ϵ can be derived
for an input perturbation bound δ, such ϵ can be viewed as
the state estimation error bound in control and leveraged for
control safety verification. The paper [14], however, does not
provide an approach for global robustness analysis.
In this section, leveraging our approach for bounding global
robustness, we conduct a case study for safety verification of
1The latest version of Reluplex is used, integrated in the tool Marabou [18].
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5. (a) Webots simulation for case study, where ego vehicle (left) follows
reference vehicle (right); (b) An example image captured by ego vehicle; (c)
Lower bound of DNN input space; (d) Upper bound of DNN input space.
control systems that use neural networks for perception. We
consider an advanced cruise control (ACC) scenario where an
ego vehicle is following a reference vehicle. The ego vehicle
is equipped with an RGB camera, and a DNN is designed to
estimate the distance from the reference vehicle based on the
camera image. We assume that the captured image may be
slightly perturbed. A feedback controller takes the estimated
distance, along with the ego vehicle speed, to generate the
control input, which is the acceleration of the ego vehicle.
We implement this scenario in the robotics simulation tool
Webots [20], as shown in Fig. 5. The ego vehicle is safe if
distance d ∈ [0.5, 1.9] and speed ve ∈ [0.1, 0.7]. The speed of
the reference vehicle vr is randomly adjusted in the range of
[0.2, 0.6]. The sampling period is 100 ms. The camera takes
RGB images with resolution 24 × 48, and an example image
is shown in Fig 5. A 5-layer DNN with 3 convolutional layers
and 2 FC layers is trained with 100k pre-captured images. The

















where the system state x = [d − 1.2, ve − 0.4]⊤ contains the
normalized distance and speed. w1 = 0.4 − vr is the external
disturbance, where vr is bounded within [0.2, 0.6] as previously
mentioned. w2 = [wd, wv]⊤ is the inaccuracy of this system
dynamics model. The control input follows the feedback control
law u = Kx̂, where K = [0.3617,−0.8582]. x̂ is the estimated
system state, and the state estimation error is ∆x = x̂ − x.
The estimation error of ego vehicle speed ve is assumed as 0.
The bound of wd, wv are profiled based on simulations, and
bounded as |wd| ≤ 5e − 4 and |wv| ≤ 3e − 5. The estimation
error for distance contains two parts ∆d = ∆d1 +∆d2, where
∆d1 is the error coming from the DNN model inaccuracy, while
∆d2 is the output variation caused by input perturbation.
The DNN model inaccuracy ∆d1 is determined by the
worst-case model inaccuracy among the dataset and set as
|∆d1| ≤ 0.0730. The DNN output variation ∆d2 is the focus
of this study and can be bounded by our global robustness
certification algorithm. Specifically, the input perturbation in
this study is bounded by δ = 2/255 (Fig. 5 illustrates the
upper and lower bound of each pixel for the input space). Then,
using our approach, we can derive a certified output variation
bound |∆d2| ≤ ϵ = 0.0568. Combined with ∆d1, we have
|∆d| ≤ 0.0730 + 0.0568 = 0.1298.
With bounds on ∆d and other variables, the vehicle control
safety can be verified based on the computation of control
invariant set, similarly as in [21]. We omit the details here for
space reason. Through such invariant set based verification, we
find that as long as the distance estimation error ∆d is within
[−0.14, 0.14], the system will always be safe. Given that our
global robustness certification bounds ∆d ≤ 0.1298, we can
assert that our ACC system is safe with this DNN design under
the assumed perturbation bound.
We also deploy our DNN model in Webots and add adver-
sarial perturbation on the input images by Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [22]. With more than 1000 minutes simula-
tion, we find that when the perturbation bound is δ = 2/255 as
assumed, the distance estimation error ∆d never exceeds the
bound and the system is always safe (as expected since it was
formally proven). When the perturbation bound is increased to
δ = 5/255, ∆d sometimes exceeds the [−0.14, 0.14] bound,
although unsafe system state is not observed. When the pertur-
bation bound is further increased to δ = 10/255, we observe
that there are about 17% of the simulations encountering unsafe
states. This shows the impact of input perturbation on system
safety and the importance of our global robustness analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
We present an efficient certification algorithm to provide
a sound and deterministic global robustness of neural net-
works with ReLU activation. Our approach is based on an
interleaving twin-network encoding (ITNE) scheme and two
over-approximation techniques that leverage the ITNE scheme.
Experiments demonstrate that our approach is much more
efficient and scalable than exact global robustness certification
approaches while providing tight over-approximation. A case
study further demonstrates the application of our approach in
safety-critical systems that use neural networks. Our future
work will focus on continuing improvement of our approach’s
efficiency, possibly via parallelization on multi-core platforms,
to enable its usage for larger-size perception neural networks.
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